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How to deal with sovereign default in Europe: 
Create the European Monetary Fund now! 
Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer 
 
Background 
The case of Greece has ushered in the second phase of 
the financial crisis, namely that of sovereign default.
1 
Members of the euro area were supposed to be shielded 
from a financial market meltdown. But, after excess 
spending during the period of easy credit, several euro 
area members are now grappling with the implosion of 
credit-financed construction and consumption booms. 
Greece is the weakest of the weak links, given its high 
public debt (around 120% of GDP), compounded by a 
government budget deficit of almost 13% of GDP, a 
huge external deficit of 11% of GDP and the loss of 
credibility from its repeated cheating on budget reports. 
Since the beginning of 2010 the scale of the 
disequilibria in Greece – as well as others in the EU, 
notably Portugal and Spain – has become the focus of 
attention of both policy-makers and markets. Doubts 
arose quickly as to whether Greece would be willing 
and able to undergo the painful adjustment in 
government finances and external competitiveness that 
would be required if their public debt position was to 
become sustainable again.  
In the case of Greece, the raw numbers speak a stark 
language: even if the IMF programme were to be 
implemented to the letter, the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio 
is projected to rise to 150% by 2013. Assuming an 
interest rate of 5%, Greece would have to pay every 
year 7.5% of its GDP to bond holders. With over 80% 
of creditors being foreign by then, the country would 
transfer over 6% of its GDP abroad. As the confidence 
evaporated in Greece’s ability to make these transfers 
                                                      
1 Rogoff & Reinhart (2009) show that historically big 
financial crises are followed by an increased frequency of 
sovereign default. 
while its competitive position remains so weak, markets 
were no longer willing to provide the country’s 
government with any new funds. 
The large bail-out package the IMF and EU 
governments then organised did not allow for the 
possibility of debt restructuring for Greece in case the 
extremely ambitious adjustment failed. Hence, markets 
remained unconvinced and turned their thumbs down on 
the programme. As doubts about the viability of the 
Greek programme intensified, markets became 
suspicious that other Euroland countries in fiscal 
distress might not find a viable solution in time either. 
With European banks holding large amounts of 
government debt and some of them at risk in case of a 
disorderly default of Greece, sovereign bond and money 
markets gummed up during the first week in May. 
In dramatic sessions over the weekend of May 7-9, 
European heads of state and government and their 
finance ministers put together a rescue package with up 
to €750 billion in loans available for countries with 
potential funding problems. This came on top of the 
already decided €110 billion package for Greece, 
bringing the total amount committed to €860 billion or 
more than $1 trillion, significantly above the amount the 
US committed under the TARP in 2009. Moreover, in a 
highly controversial move, the ECB began to intervene 
in government bond markets, propping up failing bond 
markets of governments in financial distress.
2 After an 
initial rebound, markets again turned down during the 
                                                      
2 Since they intervened in the secondary market, the ECB did 
not violate the letter of the Lisbon Treaty. However, they 
violated its spirit as central bank funding of government 
deficits is forbidden in the Treaty. The move has been 
justified by the extraordinary market tensions, which 
apparently left the bank no other choice. 
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week following the announcement. With the authorities 
yet again having failed to prepare for the case of a 
sovereign default in EMU, markets feared that impaired 
government bonds would end up on the balance sheet of 
the ECB, undermining the long-term stability of the 
euro. As a result, the European currency fell against 
most other currencies.  
Already three months ago, we urged policy-makers in 
an earlier version of this Policy Brief, dated 8 February 
2010, to create a mechanism capable of managing an 
orderly default and debt restructuring of a government 
within EMU and proposed the establishment of a 
European Monetary Fund. The events since then have in 
our view shown how urgently we need such an 
instrument. Without it, the ECB will become the ‘Bad 
Bank’ of the euro area as frightened investors are 
dumping government bonds with dubious repayment 
values on the ECB’s balance sheet. As the central 
bank’s balance sheet deteriorates, so the external value 
of its currency declines. If this continues, the internal 
value of the euro will soon follow. 
Against this background, we renew our call for a 
scheme capable of dealing with sovereign default. As 
we have argued before, without such a mechanism, 
debtor countries facing painful adjustment programmes 
retain their main negotiating asset, namely the threat of 
a disorderly default, creating systemic financial 
instability at the EU and possibly global level. This 
dilemma can be avoided by creating a European 
Monetary Fund (EMF), which would be capable of 
organising an orderly default as a measure of last resort. 
Our proposal of an EMF can also be seen as a 
complement to the ideas presently under discussion for 
allowing orderly defaults of private financial institutions 
and rescue funds for large banks that would be funded 
by the industry itself. The analogy holds in more general 
terms: in the recent financial crisis, policy has been 
geared solely towards preventing failure of large 
institutions. Going forward, however, the key policy aim 
must be to restore market discipline by making failure 
possible. In other words the euro area system should be 
made robust enough to minimise the disruption caused 
by the failure of one of its member states. 
Events so far have shown that the 'no bail-out' provision 
of the Maastricht Treaty had to be interpreted very 
generously when a crisis threatens the core of the 
financial markets in the euro area.
3 We would argue that 
our proposal is the only way to make the no bail-out 
rule credible again, and thus to give teeth to the threat 
not to bail out in future. The drafters of the Maastricht 
Treaty had failed to appreciate that, in a context of 
fragile financial markets, the real danger of a financial 
meltdown makes a 'pure' no-bail-out response 
                                                      
3 Article 125 of the Consolidated EU Treaty (formerly Article 
123 TEC). 
unrealistic. As with the case of large, systemically 
important banks, market discipline can be made credible 
only if there are clear provisions that minimise the 
disruptions to markets in case of failure.
4  
Key issues for the design of a European 
Monetary Fund 
Member countries of the EU have signed up to the 
principle of solidarity, which is enshrined in numerous 
passages of the Treaty. As recent events have shown, 
they can expect to receive support when faced with 
extraordinary financing difficulties. At the same time, 
the principle of solidarity also implies that those 
countries that might in future constitute a burden on the 
Community should contribute to building up the 
resources needed for a potential support effort. Both 
considerations apply in particular to the euro area. Its 
member countries have tied their economies tightly 
together by sharing the same currency. Problems in any 
euro area member country are bound to have strong 
negative spill-over effects for its partners. From this 
follows a particular responsibility of euro area member 
countries to avoid creating difficulties for their partners. 
This is the political logic underlying the Maastricht 
criteria for fiscal policy and the Stability Pact. The 
proposed EMF (which could be set up under the concept 
of ‘enhanced cooperation’ established in the EU Treaty) 
would be a concrete expression of this principle of 
solidarity. 
Any mutualisation of risks creates a moral hazard 
because it blunts market signals. This would argue 
against any mutual support mechanism and reliance on 
financial markets to enforce fiscal discipline. However, 
experience has shown repeatedly that market signals can 
remain weak for a long time and are often dominated by 
swings in risk appetite which can be quite violent. 
Hence, in reality the case for reliance on market signals 
as an enforcement mechanism for fiscal discipline is 
quite weak. In fact, swings in risk appetite and other 
forces that have little to do with the creditworthiness of 
a country can lead to large swings in yield differentials 
and even credit rationing that have little to do with 
economic fundamentals.  
The moral hazard problem can never be completely 
neutralised, but for our proposal it could be limited in 
two ways: through the financing mechanism of the EMF 
and conditionality attached to its support. These points 
will be discussed first, followed by a brief analysis of 
                                                      
4 Some commentators have demanded an insolvency law for 
sovereign debtors modelled after private insolvency 
procedures. However, these proposals miss the point that a 
sovereign default almost inevitably induces a banking and 
financial crisis, because sovereign debt is widely used as safe 
collateral in the financial sector. Hence, any scheme 
attempting to regulate sovereign default must include a 
mechanism for the stabilisation of the banking sector. How to deal with sovereign default in Europe: Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund | 3 
two equally important issues, namely enforcement and 
orderly default. 
1) Financing mechanism  
A simple mechanism to limit the moral hazard problem 
could be constructed as follows: Contributions 
accumulated by the EMF would depend in the first 
instance on the potential risk each member country 
represents. This risk increases of course the higher the 
country’s deficit and debt levels. Countries that breach 
the Maastricht criteria would thus make higher 
contributions, which we propose would be calculated on 
the following bases: 
1.  1% annually of the stock of ‘excess debt’, which is 
defined as the difference between the actual level of 
public debt (at the end of the previous year) and the 
Maastricht limit of 60% of GDP. For Greece with a 
debt-to-GDP ratio of 115%, this would imply a 
contribution to the EMF equal to 0.55%. 
2.  1% of the excessive deficit, i.e. the amount of the 
deficit for a given year that exceeds the Maastricht 
limit of 3% of GDP. For Greece, the deficit of 13% 
of GDP would give rise to a contribution to the 
EMF equal to 0.10% of GDP.  
Thus, the total contribution for Greece in 2009 would 
have been 0.65% of GDP.
5  This example shows that the 
additional financial burden resulting from the funding of 
the EMF would not be impossible to bear even for 
countries already under acute financial distress. 
The contributions should be based on both the deficit 
and the debt level because both represent warning signs 
of impending insolvency or liquidity risk (this is also 
the reason why both were included in the Maastricht 
criteria and both matter for the Stability Pact, although 
in practice the debt ratio has played less of a role). It 
could be argued that contributions should be based on 
market indicators of default risk rather than the 
suggested parameters. But the existence of the EMF 
would depress CDS spreads and yield differentials 
among the members of the EMF, making such a 
procedure impossible.
6  
                                                      
5 In its Communication to the Council from 12 May 2010, the 
European Commission has suggested the introduction of non-
interest bearing deposits for countries running excessive 
deficits. Our proposals go further than this in that countries 
with excessive deficits would in effect be taxed automatically. 
6 Something else would reinforce graduated pressure on 
countries with weak fiscal policies: an adjustment of the risk 
weighting under Basle II. The risk weight for government 
debt is at present 0 for governments rated AAA to A, and 
only 20% until A
- (implying that banks have to hold only 
0.2*8% = 1.6% of capital against holdings of the debt of 
governments which might have lost over 10% in value. There 
is no reason why euro area government debt should have a 
At the beginning, it would of course be necessary to 
give the EMF the authority to borrow in the markets to 
avoid a situation in which its accumulated contributions 
fall short of the requirements for funds. Borrowing by 
the EMF could be used to develop a common euro 
bond. Member countries have already started along this 
route with the €500 billion Financial Stability 
Mechanism, which was created on May 9
th. 
Contributions would be invested in investment-grade 
government debt of euro area member countries. Debt 
service (in case funds had to be raised in the market) 
would be paid from future contributions. 
Countries with exceptionally strong public finances 
would not need to contribute as much because they 
would de facto carry the burden should a crisis 
materialise. Their backing of the EMF (and the high 
rating of their bonds in the portfolio of the EMF) would 
be crucial if the EMF were called into action.
7 
It could be argued that taxing countries under fiscal 
stress to fund the EMF would only aggravate their 
problems. However, most contributions would have to 
be paid on account of moderate debt levels long before a 
crisis arises. 
With the suggested funding mechanism, the EMF would 
have been able to accumulate €120 billion in reserves 
since the start of EMU – enough probably to finance the 
rescue of any of the small-to-medium-sized euro area 
member states (and slightly more than the €110 billion 
programme for Greece). Of course, this is just an 
illustrative calculation since it is highly likely that actual 
deficits (and hence over time debt levels) would have 
been much lower, given the price countries would have 
had to pay for violating the Maastricht criteria.  
Concerning the form of intervention, in principle the 
EMF could provide financial support in one of two 
ways: it could sell part of its holdings (or raise funds in 
the markets) and provide the member country with a 
loan, or it could just provide a guarantee for a specific 
issuance of public debt. The following discussion 
assumes that the second approach will be pursued. 
2) Conditionality 
There should be two separate stages: 
Stage I: Any member country could call on the funds of 
the EMF up to the amount it has deposited in the past 
(including interest), provided its fiscal adjustment 
                                                                                            
systematically lower risk weighting than corporate debt, for 
which the risk weights are 20% and 50%, respectively. 
7 An analogy with the IMF illustrates the underlying logic:  
All countries contribute pro rata to the financing of the IMF, 
which enables it to lend to provide financing to those member 
countries in need because of balance-of-payments problems. 4 | Gros & Mayer 
programme has been approved by the Eurogroup.
8 The 
country in question could thus issue public debt with a 
guarantee of the EMF up to this amount. 
Stage II: Any drawing on the guarantee of the EMF 
above this amount would be possible only if the country 
agrees to a tailor-made adjustment programme 
supervised jointly by the Commission and the 
Eurogroup. 
With the EMF in operation, a crisis would be much less 
likely to arise. However, should a crisis arise the EMF 
could swing into action almost immediately because it 
would not have to undertake any large financial 
operation beforehand. A public finance crisis does not 
appear out of the blue. A member country encountering 
financial difficulties will have run large deficits for 
some time and its situation will thus have been closely 
monitored under the excessive deficit procedure. 
3) Enforcement 
The EU has a range of enforcement mechanisms in case 
the country in question does not live up to its 
commitments: as a first step, new funding (guarantees) 
would be cut off. This is standard, but the EU can do 
much more. Funding under the structural funds could 
also be cut off (this is already foreseen, in a weak form, 
under the Stability Pact) as well. For a country like 
Greece, this could amount to about 1-2% of GDP 
annually.  
Finally the country could effectively be cut off from the 
euro area’s money market when its government debt is 
no longer eligible as collateral for the ECB’s repo 
operations. The key point here is that these sanctions 
can be applied in an incremental manner and that they 
impose considerable economic and political costs on 
any country contemplating not implementing a 
previously agreed programme. 
4) Orderly default 
A key aspect of the discussion on the financing 
difficulties of Greece (and other Southern euro area 
member countries) is often overlooked: the need to 
prepare for failure! The strongest negotiating asset of a 
debtor is always that default cannot be contemplated 
because it would bring down the entire financial system. 
This is why it is crucial to create mechanisms to 
minimise the unavoidable disruptions resulting from a 
default. Market discipline can only be established if 
default is possible because its cost can be contained.  
A key advantage of the EMF would be that it could also 
manage an orderly default of an EMU country that fails 
                                                      
8 In formal terms this would mean that the country is 
faithfully implementing its programme and that no 
recommendation under Article 126.7 has been formulated 
within the excessive deficit procedure. 
to comply with the conditions attached to an adjustment 
programme. A simple mechanism, modelled on the 
successful experience with the Brady bonds, could do 
the trick. To safeguard against systemic effects of a 
default, the EMF could offer holders of debt of the 
defaulting country an exchange of this debt with a 
uniform haircut against claims on the EMF.  
This would be a key measure to limit the disruption 
from a default. A default creates ripple effects 
throughout the financial system because all debt 
instruments of a defaulting country become, at least 
upon impact, worthless and illiquid (for more on default 
risks, see Becker and Deuber, 2010). However, with an 
exchange à la Brady bonds, the losses to financial 
institutions would be limited (and could be controlled 
by the choice of the haircut). 
How drastic should the haircut be? The Maastricht fiscal 
criteria offer again a useful guideline. The intervention 
of the EMF could be determined in a simple way: the 
EMF could declare that it would only be willing to 
invest an amount equal to 60% of the GDP of the 
defaulting country. In other words, the haircut would be 
set in such a way that the amount the EMF has to spend 
to buy up the entire public debt of the country 
concerned is equal to 60% of the country’s GDP.  This 
would imply that for a country with a debt-to-GDP ratio 
of 120%, the haircut would be 50%, as the EMF would 
‘pay’ only 60/120. Given that the public debt of Greece 
is now already trading at discounts of about 20% (for 
longer maturities), this would mean only a modest loss 
rate for those who bought up the debt more recently.   
Of course, the size of the haircut is also a political 
decision that will be guided by a judgement on the size 
of the losses that creditors can bear without becoming a 
source of systemic instability. But uncertainty could be 
much reduced if financial markets are given this 
approach as a benchmark based on the Maastricht 
criteria. For Greece this benchmark might imply large 
losses for bond holders, but for other countries the 
haircut would be much more modest under this rule. For 
example, for Portugal it would be less than 25% and 
even close to zero for Spain. For countries with a 
fiscally more conservative history this rule could thus 
actually calm investors’ fears of large losses. 
Moreover, the EMF would exchange only those 
obligations that were either traded on open exchanges or 
had been previously registered with the special arm of 
the EMF dealing with the verification of public debt 
figures. This means the obligations resulting from secret 
derivative transactions would not be eligible for the 
exchange. This would be a strong deterrent against 
using this type of often-murky transaction with which 
governments try to massage their public finances. The 
financial institutions that engage in these transactions 
would know that in case of failure they would be last in 
line to be rescued and would thus become much less How to deal with sovereign default in Europe: Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund | 5 
interested in proposing and executing them. Especially 
in times of crisis, all creditors would have a strong 
incentive to come forward to register their claims on the 
government in financial difficulties. At present, the 
opposite seems to be the case. The financial institutions 
that concluded these derivative transactions are only 
interested in covering up the role they played in hiding 
the true state of the public finances of the countries now 
facing difficulties. 
In return for offering the exchange of bona fide public 
debt against a haircut, the EMF would acquire all the 
claims against the defaulting country. From that time 
onwards, any additional funds the country would 
receive could be used only for specific purposes 
approved by the EMF. Other EU transfer payments 
would also be disbursed by the EMF under strict 
scrutiny, or they could be used to pay down the debt 
owed by the defaulting country to the EMF. Thus, the 
EMF would provide a framework for sovereign 
bankruptcy comparable to the Chapter 11 procedure 
existing in the US for bankrupt companies that qualify 
for restructuring. Without such a procedure for orderly 
bankruptcy, the Community could be taken hostage by a 
country unwilling to adjust, threatening to trigger a 
systemic crisis if financial assistance is not forthcoming.  
Member states of the EU remain sovereign countries. A 
defaulting country may regard such intrusion into its 
policies by the EMF as a violation of its sovereignty and 
hence unacceptable. But an E(M)U member country that 
refused to accept the decisions of the EMF could leave 
the EU, and with this, EMU,
9 under Article 50 of the 
Treaty.
10 The price for doing so would of course be 
much greater than that exacted in the case of the default 
of Argentina. If a country refused all cooperation and 
did not leave the EU on this own, it could effectively be 
thrown out by recourse to Article 60 of the Vienna 
Convention on International Treaties, or Article 7 of the 
Treaty of Lisbon could be invoked. 
 
                                                      
9 For the legal issues surrounding a withdrawal from the euro 
area, see Athanassiou (2009). 
10 Article 50 of TEU:  
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union 
in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the 
European Council of its intention. In the light of the 
guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall 
negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting 
out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union. That 
agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 
218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament. 
Concluding remarks 
We argue that now is the time to set up a European 
Monetary Fund to provide a framework of how to deal 
with euro area member countries in financial 
difficulties. The existing €860 billion facilities for 
Greece and the euro stabilisation mechanism should be 
merged into the EMF. Experience has by now shown 
that without a clear framework, decisions about how to 
organise financial support typically have to be taken 
hurriedly, under extreme time pressure, and often during 
a weekend when the turmoil in financial markets has 
become unbearable, making a full bailout the only 
option.  
We see two key advantages of our proposal: first, the 
funding of the EMF should give clear incentives for 
countries to keep their fiscal house in order at all times. 
Secondly, and perhaps even more important, the EMF 
could provide for an orderly sovereign bankruptcy 
procedure that minimises the disruption resulting from a 
default. Recent events have vividly demonstrated that in 
the absence of a mechanism to manage an orderly 
sovereign default, adjustment programmes lack 
credibility and the balance sheet of the ECB is put at 
risk. Indeed, without a fiscal agent like the EMF in 
times of crises, the ECB becomes the fiscal agent of 
euro area governments by default. This role, if 
maintained, will destroy the institution in the 
intermediate future. 
Both the incentives for fiscal discipline and the 
establishment of bankruptcy procedures for euro 
sovereigns would decisively lower the moral hazard 
problem that pervades the present situation in which 
both the markets and the government of the country 
under pressure assume that, in the end, they can count 
on a bailout because the EU could not contemplate the 
bankruptcy of one of its members. We should by now 
have learned that policy should not only be geared 
towards preventing failure, but preparing for it. 
In addition, the EMF could contribute decisively to the 
transparency of public finances because its intervention 
mechanism in the case of failure would penalise all 
derivatives and other transactions that had not been 
previously registered with a special registry of public 
debt, which the EMF would maintain. 
The experience of Argentina shows that default arises 
only after a lengthy period of several years in which 
economic and political difficulties interact and reinforce 
each other. Failure of the adjustment programme of 
Greece is not inevitable, as the relatively successful 
experience so far with tough adjustment programmes in 
Ireland and Latvia shows. But what is unavoidable is a 
considerable period of uncertainty. With an EMF, the 
ECB would be protected from becoming an agent for 
fiscal policy and the EU would be much better prepared 
to face the difficult times. 6 | Gros & Mayer 
This is the key issue facing the EU today: all the 
historical evidence shows that in a crisis private debt 
tends to become public debt. Given the unprecedented 
growth in private debt over the last decade, the EU must 
now prepare for a long period of stress in public 
finances. The Stability Pact, which was meant to 
prevent such problems, has manifestly failed. Merely 
reinforcing it as the Commission has recently proposed 
will not do the trick. It is now time to look for a new 
framework that allows the Union to deal with the 
possibility of financial failure of one of its members. 
Failure to establishment such a framework could 
eventually spell the end of the euro. 
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Annex 1. Argentina: Brief chronology of the run-up to the 2001 crisis 
In 1991, following decades of disastrous economic performance characterised by combinations of high deficits and 
inflation, Argentina embarked on a radical experiment. The old currency was replaced by a new one which was linked 
by currency board arrangement 1:1 to the US dollar. Initially the new arrangement worked very well. Growth returned 
and the confidence of foreign investors was such that large inflows of foreign direct investment, especially the banking 
sector, began to materialise. 
However, later into the 1990s, problems developed. A series of external shocks (Asian and later Russian debt crises 
and especially the Brazilian devaluation of 1999) hit Argentina hard. Especially the latter meant that the Argentine 
currency had become overvalued. Growth slowed down, putting pressure on public finance and twin deficits (external 
and public sector) became pervasive. By 2000, investors started to worry about future developments, and the price of 
bonds issued by the Argentine government started to drop (at the time the CDS market had not yet developed as a 
measure of default probability). 
In March 2000, the IMF approved a three-year stand-by credit ($7.2 billion) to be treated as ‘precautionary’. It replaced 
an expiring three-year EFF (Extended Financing Facility). The programme envisaged a resumption of growth, a decline 
in fiscal deficit and structural reforms. None of that was subsequently achieved. The economic difficulties then led to 
political problems. The Vice President resigned by the end of the year and the ruling coalition (the Alianza) started to 
crumble.  
During this period it became clear that only a tough adjustment process, including an ‘internal devaluation’ via 
deflation and nominal wage cuts, could save the country. But this would not only require strong political will but also 
the cooperation of the social partners and the confidence of the public in general. The evolution of domestic banking 
sector deposits (see chart below with monthly data by the Central Bank) become the indicator to watch, and sure 
enough locals started withdrawing deposits. This was the beginning of the end. 
Given the continuing external financing difficulties, the IMF granted Argentina an augmentation of the stand-by to $14 
billion in the first quarter of 2001, part of a ‘mega-package’ of loans by the World Bank, the IADB and the government 
of Spain. To restore investor confidence the government even roped in Domingo Cavallo, the architect of the currency 
board back in 1991, as a key minister. 
However, the economic situation continued to deteriorate despite the massive financial aid. To reduce the need for 
refinancing of the stock of debt, in June of 2001 Cavallo proposed a voluntary debt restructuring, which succeeded, but 
only at the cost of double-digit interest rates (about 16%, higher in real terms given deflation). The IMF welcomed the 
restructuring and the high participation of foreign bondholders. One month later (July 2001) the government proposed 
(and congress approved) a ‘zero-fiscal deficit’ law. However, domestic depositors continued to flee.  
In September 2001 the IMF again augmented the stand-by to $22 billion. All along, the texts of the IMF releases read 
almost identically in terms of conditions and expectations (structural reform, etc.). 
However, the economic and political situation continued to deteriorate in the last quarter of 2001. The opposition (the 
Peronists) won the mid-term elections. In November, international bonds held by locals were converted into 
‘guaranteed loans’ backed by a financial transactions tax. 
In December 2001, Cavallo announced restrictions on the withdrawal of sight deposits (saying that people could use 
debit cards to make payments – except that those were practically unknown in Argentina). This ushered in the end-
game for the De la Rúa government: riots broke out and the president had to flee by helicopter. Parliament announced 
the default on $130 billion of external debt.  
Over the next few months (December 2001 to January 2002), there was a quick succession of presidents. The currency 
peg was abandoned. The (mostly foreign owned) banks were practically expropriated by the asymmetric (and forced) 
conversion of deposits and loans: USD-denominated loans were converted into pesos (‘pesification’), at the old rate 
ARS/USD=1. Foreign currency deposits were initially frozen, but later (after the lifting of freeze) adjusted in value, 
and converted at a rate much closer to the market exchange rate, which reached ARS/USD=4 in Q1/2002. Regulatory 
forbearance over the following years prevented the system’s bankruptcy. 
Foreign creditors received later less than 30 cents on the dollar. It is noteworthy that the $130 billion in foreign debt 
represented less than 50% of (pre-crisis) GDP for Argentina. By contrast, for Portugal and Greece, foreign debt now 
amounts to about 100% of GDP. 
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Annex 2. The vulnerability index 
In order to measure the degree of a country’s financial vulnerability to a sudden stop in external financing (and thus 
financial turmoil), three dimensions should be taken into account:  
1)  the state of public finances (deficit and level of debt), 
2)  the availability of national (both private and public) resources (savings) and 
3)  the need for external finance and the competitive position as an indicator to service external debt. 
For this purpose we combine five indicators. 
Two concern the state of public finances: 1) the government debt-to-GDP ratio and 2) fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio. 
To these standard indicators, we add 3) net national savings as a share of national income. The latter, unlike the current 
account, does not simply inform about whether and how much a country as whole is borrowing but also whether the 
amount of national resources is sufficient to keep the level of existing capital constant.  
The last two indicators measure the position of the country with respect to the rest of the world, namely, 4) its current 
account balance (as share of GDP) and 5) its relative unit labour costs. The latter provide a measure of competitiveness 
to assess the ability of a country to generate future export surpluses to service its external debt.  
To make these various measures comparable, each one is standardized subtracting the (cross country) mean and 
dividing by the standard deviation. The overall vulnerability index is then simply the sum of the five standardised 
variables where national savings, fiscal balance and current account balance have a negative sign.  
Vulnerability in the euro area 
  
Gross debt  
(% GDP) 
Fiscal 
balance 
(% GDP) 
Nominal 
unit 
labour 
cost 
Current 
account  
(% GDP) 
Net 
National  
Savings  
(% national 
income) 
Vulnerability 
index 
Greece 1.9  -1.8  0.7  -1.2  -1.1 6.7 
Portugal 0.4  -0.3  0.6  -1.6  -1.9  5.0 
Ireland 0.4  -2.5  0.4  -0.1  -0.3 3.7 
Italy 1.6  0.6  1.0  -0.1  -0.4  2.6 
Spain -0.2  -1.0  0.6  -0.6  -0.3  2.3 
France  0.4  -0.4 -0.7 -0.1  0.0  0.2 
Belgium 1.0  0.4  -0.4  0.5  0.5  -0.6 
Netherlands  -0.2  0.3 0.7 0.9  0.4  -1.1 
Finland  -0.9  0.8 0.1 0.5  0.2  -2.2 
Austria 0.1  0.5  -0.7  0.5  0.7 -2.4 
Germany 0.2 0.7  -2.4  1.0 0.5  -4.5 
Source: AMECO and own computations.  
The table above shows the standardised values for each of the indicators applied to the 2010 forecast of the European 
Commission and the corresponding vulnerability index. Greece is the frontrunner as the most vulnerable country of the 
euro area, followed by Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain respectively. 
Analogous computations for the years between 2000 and 2009 suggest that the ranking did not change much over time. 
Since 2000, Greece, Portugal and Italy always appear on the top of the list. The real novelty is Ireland which has 
overtaken Spain in 2008 and even Italy in 2009. Of course the index does not account for the ongoing adjustment 
process. Unlike other countries, Ireland is already experiencing a painful adjustment in wages. In perspective, this puts 
Ireland in a better condition than its Mediterranean ‘mates’ even if it is still vulnerable.   
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Annex 3. Private and public debt  
Financial crises usually lead to a surge in public debt, which replaces private debt that has gone sour. The present crisis 
is no exception. Many European countries enjoyed credit-fuelled booms (in some cases, bubbles) with the private 
sector spending far more than its income and creating large current account deficits. When the crash came, the supply 
of creditworthy borrowers collapsed and so did private spending. Governments have responded by supporting the 
economy and in some cases bailing out the banking system with considerable effects on their fiscal position. The 
graphs below showing the evolution of public and private debt in the euro area and the United States support this 
argument for both regions. As the growth rate of private debt shrinks or becomes negative, public debt increases. 
Euro area private and public debt (moving average of first difference over four quarters) 
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US private and public debt (moving average of first difference over four quarters) 
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